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DLA PIPER US LLP 2000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE E. PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248			EXAMINER WANG, BEN C	
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**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/718,867

Applicant(s)

SONG ET AL.

Examiner

Ben C. Wang

Art Unit

2192

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

### Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

### Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 21 September 2007.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

### Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-46 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-46 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

### Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☒ The drawing(s) filed on 21 November 2003 is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☒ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

### Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

### Attachment(s)

- ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

### DETAILED ACTION

1. Applicant's amendment dated September 21, 2007, responding to the Office action mailed March 21, 2007 provided in the rejection of claims 1-46, wherein claims 1 and 24 are amended.

Claims 1-46 remain pending in the application and which have been fully considered by the examiner.

There are NO revised drawings received.

Applicant's arguments with respect to claims rejection have been fully considered but are moot in view of the new grounds of rejection – see *Softtricity*, art made of record, as applied hereto.

Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a).

Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

### ***Drawing Objections***

2. Drawing is objected to because the following informalities:
- The labels of “No” and “Yes” associated with step “182” (conditional diamond box – “Is process list processed ID in OS process list”), Fig. 6, should be corrected as opposite way.

Appropriate correction is required.

### ***Claim Objections***

3. Claims 4-5 and 28-29 are objected to because the following informalities:
- “repeating component hooker injection for all the new secured application process<sub>1</sub>”, claim 4, line 56, should be corrected as “repeating component hooker injection for all the new secured application process<sub>2</sub>”.
  - “for the termination of each said secured run-time application<sub>1</sub>”, claim 5, line 64, should be corrected as “for the termination of each said secured run-time application<sub>2</sub>”.
  - “repeating component hooker injection for all the new secured application process<sub>1</sub>”, claim 28, line 221, should be corrected as “repeating component hooker injection for all the new secured application process<sub>2</sub>”.

- “for the termination of each said secured run-time application<sub>i</sub>”, claim 29, line 229, should be corrected as “for the termination of each said secured run-time application<sub>i</sub>”.

Appropriate correction is required.

***Claim Rejections – 35 USC § 103(a)***

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made

4. Claims 1-7, 9-30, and 32-46 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blaser et al. (Pat. No. US 7,117,495 B2) (hereinafter 'Blaser') in view of Softricity®, Inc., (*Softricity SystemGurad®*, October 2002, *Softricity®*, Inc., pp. 1-2) (hereinafter 'Softricity' - art made of record)

5. **As to claim 1** (Currently Amended), Blaser discloses a system for executing application software (e.g., Fig. 1, element 104 - Applications; Fig. 2, element 200 – Application) on a operating system within a secured run-time environment (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-38 – Secure Applications; Col. 11, Line 63 through Col. 12, Line 7 – Secure Base OS; Col. 13, Lines 1-4, 16-23) without

affecting an application software resources of a client computer (e.g., Col. 7, Lines 24-34; Col. 13, Lines 30-33), the system comprising:

- an application wrapper (e.g., Fig. 1, element 106 – Layering System Libraries/Software; Fig. 2, elements 202 – Layer B, 204 – Layer A; Fig. 3, elements 300 – FSL (File System Layer) Management Application, 306 – FSL API Library, 310 – FSL Compression Library, 312 – FSL System Driver), wherein the application wrapper shields the application software resources (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26 – layering system libraries and/or software intercepts files system and registry access from applications), whereby the secured run-time environment for executing the application software is created and the application software resources are protected (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-38 – Secure Applications; Col. 11, Line 63 through Col. 12, Line 7 – Secure Base OS; Col. 13, Lines 1-4, 16-23); and
- the application wrapper further comprising a privatized virtual file resource created from an operating system file system (e.g., Fig. 3; Col. 13, Line 58 through Col. 14, Line 11 – an FSL system driver is installed “on top” of the operating system in order to have first processing priority for file system accesses), a privatized virtual registry created from an operating system registry system (e.g., Fig. 3; Col. 13, Line 58 through Col. 14, Line 11 – an FSL system driver is installed “on top” of the operating system in order to have first processing priority for registry), a privatized operating system shared component resource (e.g., Col. 5, Lines 18-32; Col. 6, Line 62 through Col. 7, Line 17), a privatized application configuration resource (e.g., Col. 2,

Lines 50-52 – having facilities for providing configuration settings to applications; Col. 3, Lines 42-46, 51-58; Col. 4, Lines 23-26 – a layer manager application may be provided to permit control and configuration of the layering system software through a management API and library; Col. 5, Lines 23-29; Col. 7, Lines 48-53; Col. 9, Lines 6-11; Col. 11, Lines 16-19) and a privatized environmental resources for application variables (e.g., Col. 8, Lines 48-61 – for example, Windows operating systems set the "WINDIR" environment variable to the location of the OS system subtree...; Col. 8, Line 67 through Col. 9, Line 11).

Although Blaser discloses that applications can be protected from unauthorized access through the use of a layer system (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-22) but does not explicitly disclose the followings:

- wherein the application software only access the privatized virtual file resource; and
- wherein the application software only accesses the privatized virtual registry.

However, in an analogous art of *Softricity SystemGurad®*, Softricity discloses the followings:

- wherein the application software only access the privatized virtual file resource (e.g., Fig. of 'SoftGrid® Environment'; Sec. of 'SystemGuard® Capabilities', Sub-Sec. of 'Virtual File System' – SystemGurad® also handles requests made by applications to files in specific directories by redirecting the requests. For example, if an

application looks for a file located in a specific directory on the local C drive, SystemGurad® can redirect any requests to that directory inside of its virtual file system); and

- wherein the application software only accesses the privatized virtual registry (e.g., Fig. of 'SoftGrid® Environment'; Sec. of 'SystemGuard® Capabilities', Sub-Sec. of 'Virtual Registry' – SystemGurad® creates a virtual Registry for each application. Registry settings created cannot be seen by other applications).

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made to combine the teachings of Softricity into the Blaser's system to further provide the followings in Blaser system:

- wherein the application software only access the privatized virtual file resource; and
- wherein the application software only accesses the privatized virtual registry.

The motivation is that it would further enhance the Blaser's system by taking, advancing and/or incorporating Softricity's system which offers significant advantages that with the SoftGrid® solution, software deployment is simplified and the problem of application and operating system instability is alleviated, since applications are never installed on computers. Instead, applications run inside Softricity®'s patent-pending SystemGuard® Virtual Environment which protects the computer's operating system from any alterations and enable' the



application to run intact as once suggested by Softricity (e.g., Sec. of 'The Solution: Stop Installing Software').

6. **As to claim 2** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatized virtual file resource (e.g., Col. 16, Line 11 through Col. 18, Line 12 – File System Calls) further comprising:

- intercepting file I/O request generated by one or more processes (e.g., Fig. 5, step 502 – “wait for read request”; Fig. 6, step 602 – “wait for write request”);
- establishing a process ID for the intercepted file I/O request (e.g., Col. 9, Lines 34-38, 58-63; Col. 30, Lines 52-53, 58-61);
- comparing process ID to establish operating system process and secured run-time process (e.g., Fig. 5, step 504 – “is file reference maintained in an enabled layer?”; Fig. 6, step 604 – “is file reference to be captured to an enabled layer?”; Col. 6, Lines 37-39; Col. 15, Lines 16-26);
- establishing a process ID as operating system process and secured run-time process (e.g., Col. 9, Lines 34-38, 58-63; Col. 30, Lines 52-53, 58-61);
- servicing the file I/O request for all process ID established as secured run-time process (e.g., Fig. 5, steps 508, 510, 512; Fig. 6, steps 608, 610, 612);  
redirecting the file I/O request to operating system service for process ID established as operating system process (e.g., Fig. 5, step 506 – “use reference of request to execute regular read”; Fig. 6, step 606 – “use reference of request to execute regular write”; Col. 4, Lines 15-26; Col. 9,

Lines 29-33; Col. 14, Line 64 through Col. 15, Line 3; Col. 15, Line 66 through Col. 16, Line 3; Col. 16, Lines 41-44; Col. 17, Lines 5-13, 24-28);

- rejecting the file I/O request on secured run-time process resources for process ID established as operating system process (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26; Col. 9, Lines 29-33; Col. 14, Line 64 through Col. 15, Line 3; Col. 15, Line 66 through Col. 16, Line 3; Col. 16, Lines 41-44; Col. 17, Lines 5-13, 24-28);
- comparing process ID established as secured run-time process to further establish process resources corresponding to process ID (e.g., Col. 15, Lines 16-26);
- establishing corresponding process resources within secured run-time resources (e.g., Fig. 5, steps 508, 510, 512; Fig. 6, steps 608, 610, 612); and
- rejecting the file I/O request on secured run-time process resources for process ID established as secured run-time process and process ID belongs to other process resources (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26; Col. 9, Lines 29-33; Col. 14, Line 64 through Col. 15, Line 3; Col. 15, Line 66 through Col. 16, Line 3; Col. 16, Lines 41-44; Col. 17, Lines 5-13, 24-28).

7. **As to claim 3** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatized virtual registry (e.g., Col. 18 Line 13 through Col. 20, Line 18 – Registry Calls) further comprises:

- privatizing virtual registry system by intercepting registry I/O request generated by several process (Fig. 7, step 702 – “waiting for request for registry setting”; Col. 6, Lines 33-37);
- establishing process ID for the intercepted registry I/O request (e.g., Col. 9, Lines 34-38, 58-63; Col. 30, Lines 52-53, 58-61);
- comparing process ID to establish operating system process and secured run-time process (e.g., Fig. 7, step 704 – “is registry request to be captured to an enabled layer?”; Col. 6, Lines 37-39; Col. 15, Lines 16-26);
- establishing process ID as operating system process and secured run-time process (e.g., Fig. 7, step 708 – identify destination layer; Col. 6, Lines 41-43);
- servicing the registry I/O request for all process ID established as secured run-time process (e.g., Fig. 7, elements 712 – create virtual registry setting in layer, 716- create delete entry in virtual registry, or delete entry if isolated to layer, 720 – set virtual registry setting in layer; Col. 6, Lines 44-55);
- redirecting the registry I/O request to operating system service for process ID established as operating system process (e.g., Fig. 7, element 706 – execute normal registry function; Col. 6, Lines 39-41; Col. 14, Line 64 through Col. 15, Line 3; Col. 15, Lines 16-26; Col. 15, Line through Col. 16, Line 11 – the structures and hooks);
- rejecting the registry I/O request on secured run-time process resources for process ID established as operating system process (e.g., Fig. 7, element

706 – execute normal registry function; Col. 6, Lines 39-41; Col. 15, Lines 16-26);

- comparing process ID established as secured run-time process to further establish process resources corresponding to process ID (e.g., Col. 15, Lines 16-26);
- establishing corresponding process resources within secured run-time resources (e.g., Fig. 7, elements 712, 716, 720); and
- rejecting the registry I/O request on secured run-time process resources for process ID established as secured run-time process and process ID belongs to other process resources (e.g., Fig. 7, elements 706 – execute normal registry function; Col. 6, Lines 39-41, 708 – identify destination layer; Col. 6, Lines 41-43).

8. **As to claim 4** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatizing operating system shared component resource (e.g., Col. 5, Lines 18-32; Col. 6, Line 62 through Col. 7, Line 17) further comprising:

- searching secured application process for injecting component hooker (e.g., Col. 9, Lines 43-46; Col. 15, Line 46 through Col. 16, Line 11);
- checking the secured application process to establish whether the process is injected with component hooker (e.g., Col. 16, Lines 36-38, 45-47);

- establishing the secured application process as new secured application process for the secured application process not injected with component hooker (e.g., Col. 8, Lines 11-18; Col. 19, Lines 28-36);
- injecting component hooker to new secured application process to intercept component process (e.g., Fig. 3, element 312 – FSL System Driver; Col. 9, Lines 6-11; Col. 13, Line 62 through Col. 14, Line 2; Col. 15, Lines 42-44 – all of the file system entry points are hooked in; the drives to be redirected are hooked in; all of the Registry entry points are hooked in);
- repeating component hooker injection for all the new secured application process (e.g., Col. 12, Lines 29-31).

9. **As to claim 5** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatizing operating system shared component resource further comprising:

- Initializing component redirection table to provide component redirecting information (e.g., Fig. 7, element 712 – create virtual registry setting in layer; Col. 14, Lines 17-22, 30-31 – *FileRedirect*, 36-37 – *RegRedirect*; Col. 20, lower portion for Function/Description List – *FSLCreate()* – create the layer redirection area in the file system);
- Registering virtual component required for the secured application (e.g., Fig. 7, element 716 – set virtual registry setting in layer; Col. 27 –

Function/Description List – *FSLSetLayerInfo()* – if *fileRedirect* is specified, set the value of the proper registry value... create the redirect root keys.);

- Adding redirecting information to the component redirection table for the execution of each selected the secured run-time application (e.g., Col. 25 – Function/Description list – *FSLRegCreateKeyEx()* – create a registry path to the layer's redirection area using the layer's redirect path, its name, .... Create the key in the redirection area);
- Removing component redirecting information from the component redirection table for the termination of each the secured run-time application (e.g., Fig. 7, element 716 – delete entry if isolated to layer).

10. **As to claim 6** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatizing operating system shared component resource further comprising:

- intercepting component process function for replacing component search path with secured application resource path (e.g., Fig. 5, element 502; Fig. 6, element 602; Fig. 7, element 702);
- replacing component search path with private resource path to load the component from the secured application resource path (e.g., Col. 5, Lines 60-64; Col. 6, Lines 12-17; Col. 8, Lines 48-52); and

- creating new process for the intercepted component with the replaced secured application resource path (e.g., Col. 15, Lines 58-60; Col. 16, Lines 19-48; Col. 16, Line 53 through Col. 17, Line 36; Col. 18, Lines 26-61).

11. **As to claim 7** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatizing operating system shared component resource further comprising:

- intercepting component call for replacing component registry path with the privatized virtual registry path (e.g., Fig. 7, element 702);
- searching component redirection table for the component redirecting information (e.g., Col. 18, Lines 26-28; Col. 19, Lines 24-26; Col. 19, Line 37 through Col. 20, Line 3);
- replacing component registry path with the privatized virtual registry path retrieved from the component redirection table (e.g., Col. 15, Lines 58-60; Col. 16, Lines 19-48; Col. 16, Line 53 through Col. 17, Line 36; Col. 18, Lines 26-61);
- returning the intercepted call to the requested call with the replaced secured application registry path for addressing the component location from the privatized virtual registry system and further the component is addressed to load from the privatized virtual file system (e.g., Fig. 7, element 708; Col. 6, Lines 41-43);

- redirecting the component call as it is to the requested call for the component call originated from non secured run-time application and for the component call, which do not have redirecting information in the component redirection table (e.g., Fig. 7, element 706 – “execute normal registry function”; Col. 6, Lines 39-41).

12. **As to claim 9** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatized application configuration resource further comprises:

- monitoring file I/O request for configuration file to provide separate configuration file (e.g., Fig. 5, element 502; Fig. 6, element 602; Col. 9, Lines 6-11);
- searching and retrieving configuration file from secured application resources (e.g., Col. 2, Lines 50-52 – having facilities for providing configuration settings to applications; Col. 3, Lines 42-46, 51-58; Col. 4, Lines 23-26 – a layer manager application may be provided to permit control and configuration of the layering system software through a management API and library); and
- serving application configuration file to requesting process (e.g., Col. 5, Lines 23-29; Col. 7, Lines 48-53; Col. 11, Lines 16-19).

13. **As to claim 10** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses privatized environmental resources (e.g., Col. 8, Lines 48-61 – for example, Windows operating systems set the “WINDIR” environment variable to



the location of the OS system subtree...; Col. 8, Line 67 through Col. 9, Line 11)  
further comprises:

- intercepting environment variable request to supply private values to secured application process (e.g., Fig. 5, element 502; Fig. 6, element 602; Col. 9, Lines 6-11);
- verifying process ID to establish the process ID as operating system process or secured application process (e.g., Fig. 5, step 504 – “is file reference maintained in an enabled layer?”; Fig. 6, step 604 – “is file reference to be captured to an enabled layer?”; Col. 6, Lines 37-39; Col. 15, Lines 16-26);
- redirecting the call for process ID established as operating system process (e.g., Fig. 5, element 506; Fig. 6, element 606);
- reading variable data from secured application resource and returning the value to requested process for read variable calls requested by the secured application process (e.g., Fig. 5, element 512; Col. 5, Lines 60-64) ;
- searching the requesting write variable in secured application resource to find the presence of requesting write variable (e.g., Col. 23 – Function/Description List – *FSLFindCloseVariable()*, *FSLFindFirstVariable()*, *FSLFindNextVariable()*, *FSLGetVariable()*);
- creating variable with variable data within secured application resource and returning the status to requested process for variable do not exist in secured application resource (e.g., Col. 20, lower portion – Function/Description List – *FSLAddVariable()*); and

- updating variable with variable data within secured application resource and returning the status to requested process for variable exist in secured application resource (e.g., Col. 8, Line 61 through Col. 9, Line 4).

14. **As to claim 11** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses the application wrapper further comprises selectively allowing the application software to interact operating system resources directly during the application software executing under the secured run-time environment (e.g., Fig. 3, element 304 – Other Applications; Col. 14, Lines 6-11).

15. **As to claim 12** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses the application Wrapper further comprises selectively allowing the application software to interact with other application software resources directly during the application software executing under the secured run-time environment (e.g., Fig. 3, element 304 – Other Applications; Col. 14, Lines 6-11).

16. **As to claim 13** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses the application wrapper further comprises providing a run-time environment to the application software that is visible to an operating system run-time environment without having the application software run-time resources, whereby the application software resources is simulated to the secured run-time environment during the execution of the application software (e.g., Col. 12, Lines

8-20 – all further changes are recorded to a layer and not to the underlying file systems and OS resources).

17. **As to claim 14** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 13), Blaser discloses the system and method further comprising means (e.g., Fig. 1, element 106 – Layering System Libraries/Software; Fig. 2, elements 202 – Layer B, 204 – Layer A; Fig. 3, elements 300 – FSL (File System Layer) Management Application, 306 – FSL API Library, 310 – FSL Compression Library, 312 – FSL System Driver) for protecting the behavior of the application software from other application and the operating system (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-38 – Secure Applications; Col. 11, Line 63 through Col. 12, Line 7 – Secure Base OS; Col. 13, Lines 1-4, 16-23).

18. **As to claim 15** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 13), Blaser discloses the system and method further comprising means (e.g., Fig. 1, element 106 – Layering System Libraries/Software; Fig. 2, elements 202 – Layer B, 204 – Layer A; Fig. 3, elements 300 – FSL (File System Layer) Management Application, 306 – FSL API Library, 310 – FSL Compression Library, 312 – FSL System Driver) for eliminating the application conflicts from other running application software (e.g., Col. 2, Lines 42-46; Col. 3, Lines 51-58; Col. 8, Lines 11-18).

19. **As to claim 16** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 13), Blaser discloses the system and the method further comprising means for executing multiple instance of the single application software (e.g., Col. 8, Lines 6-11).

20. **As to claim 17** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses the system and the method wherein the application wrapper further comprising maintaining the application software resources away from the operating system resources (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26 – layering system libraries and/or software intercepts files system and registry access from applications), whereby the operating system resources is protected from the application software resources (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-38 – Secure Applications; Col. 11, Line 63 through Col. 12, Line 7 – Secure Base OS; Col. 13, Lines 1-4, 16-23).

21. **As to claim 18** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses the system and the method wherein the application wrapper further comprises permitting full access to the application software that requires to access for variation occurs to the application software resources within the application wrapper (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26; Col. 8, Lines 19-23, 48-55).

22. **As to claim 19** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 18), Blaser discloses the system and the method further comprising means for keeping the state of secured run-time environment to the application software (e.g., Col. 6,

Lines 3-10; Col. 7, Lines 9-12; Col. 10, Lines 2-24; Col. 11, Line 63 through Col. 12, Line 7).

23. **As to claim 20** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 18), Blaser discloses the system and the method further comprising means for updating the application software resources required by the application software (e.g., Col. 5, Lines 18-32 - shared libraries, system accessible configuration, and version control are managed by the layering subsystem).

24. **As to claim 21** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), Blaser discloses the system and the method wherein the application wrapper monitors the application run-time request to determine the required the application software resources for execution (e.g., Fig. 1, element 106 – Layering System Libraries/Software; Col. 4, Lines 15-26).

25. **As to claim 22** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 21), Blaser discloses the system and the method further comprising means for receiving the application software resources to execute the application software in the secured run-time environment (e.g., Fig. 1, element 106 – Layering System Libraries/Software; Fig. 2, elements 202 – Layer B, 204 – Layer A; Fig. 3, elements 300 – FSL (File System Layer) Management Application, 306 – FSL API Library, 310 – FSL Compression Library, 312 – FSL System Driver).

26. **As to claim 23** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 21), Blaser discloses the system and the method further comprising means for incrementally executing the application software in the secured run-time environment (e.g., Col. 3, Line 59 through Col. 4, Line 6; Col. 5, Lines 18-32 – shared libraries, system accessible configuration, and version control are managed by the layering subsystem).

27. **As to claim 24** (Currently Amended), Blaser discloses a method for executing application software on a operating system within a secured run-time environment (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-38 – Secure Applications; Col. 11, Line 63 through Col. 12, Line 7 – Secure Base OS; Col. 13, Lines 1-4, 16-23) without affecting an application software resources of a client computer (e.g., Col. 7, Lines 24-34; Col. 13, Lines 30-33), the client computer comprising an application wrapper (Fig. 1, element 106 – Layering System Libraries/Software; Fig. 2, elements 202 – Layer B, 204 – Layer A; Fig. 3, elements 300 – FSL (File System Layer) Management Application, 306 – FSL API Library, 310 – FSL Compression Library, 312 – FSL System Driver), wherein the application wrapper shields the application software resources (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26 – layering system libraries and/or software intercepts files system and registry access from applications), whereby a the secured run-time environment for executing an the application software is created and the application software resources is protected (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-38 – Secure Applications; Col. 11, Line 63

through Col. 12, Line 7 – Secure Base OS; Col. 13, Lines 1-4, 16-23), the method further comprising:

- privatizing virtual file resource created from an operating system file system (e.g., Fig. 3; Col. 13, Line 58 through Col. 14, Line 11 – an FSL system driver is installed “on top” of the operating system in order to have first processing priority for file system accesses);
- privatizing virtual registry created from an operating system registry system (e.g., Fig. 3; Col. 13, Line 58 through Col. 14, Line 11 – an FSL system driver is installed “on top” of the operating system in order to have first processing priority for registry);
  - privatizing operating system shared component resource (e.g., Col. 5, Lines 18-32; Col. 6, Line 62 through Col. 7, Line 17);
  - privatizing application configuration resource (e.g., Col. 2, Lines 50-52 – having facilities for providing configuration settings to applications; Col. 3, Lines 42-46, 51-58; Col. 4, Lines 23-26 – a layer manager application may be provided to permit control and configuration of the layering system software through a management API and library; Col. 5, Lines 23-29; Col. 7, Lines 48-53; Col. 9, Lines 6-11; Col. 11, Lines 16-19); and
  - privatizing environmental resources for application variables (e.g., Col. 8, Lines 48-61 – for example, Windows operating systems set the

"WINDIR" environment variable to the location of the OS system subtree...; Col. 8, Line 67 through Col. 9, Line 11).

Although Blaser discloses that applications can be protected from unauthorized access through the use of a layer system (e.g., Col. 11, Lines 20-22) but does not explicitly disclose the followings:

- wherein the application software only access the privatized virtual file resource; and
- wherein the application software only accesses the privatized virtual registry.

However, in an analogous art of *Softricity SystemGurad®*, Softricity discloses the followings:

- wherein the application software only access the privatized virtual file resource (e.g., Fig. of 'SoftGrid® Environment'; Sec. of 'SystemGuard® Capabilities', Sub-Sec. of 'Virtual File System' – SystemGurad® also handles requests made by applications to files in specific directories by redirecting the requests. For example, if an application looks for a file located in a specific directory on the local C drive, SystemGurad® can redirect any requests to that directory inside of its virtual file system); and
- wherein the application software only accesses the privatized virtual registry (e.g., Fig. of 'SoftGrid® Environment'; Sec. of 'SystemGuard® Capabilities', Sub-Sec. of 'Virtual Registry' –



SystemGuard® creates a virtual Registry for each application.

Registry settings created cannot be seen by other applications).

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made to combine the teachings of Softricity into the Blaser's system to further provide the followings in Blaser system:

- wherein the application software only access the privatized virtual file resource; and
- wherein the application software only accesses the privatized virtual registry.

The motivation is that it would further enhance the Blaser's system by taking, advancing and/or incorporating Softricity's system which offers significant advantages that with the SoftGrid® solution, software deployment is simplified and the problem of application and operating system instability is alleviated, since applications are never installed on computers. Instead, applications run inside Softricity®'s patent-pending SystemGuard® Virtual Environment which protects the computer's operating system from any alterations and enable' the application to run intact as once suggested by Softricity (e.g., Sec. of 'The Solution: Stop Installing Software').

28. **As to claim 25** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim 2 as set forth accordingly.

29. **As to claim 26** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **3** as set forth accordingly.

30. **As to claim 27** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **6** as set forth accordingly.

31. **As to claim 28** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **4** as set forth accordingly.

32. **As to claim 29** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **5** as set forth accordingly.

33. **As to claim 30** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **7** as set forth accordingly.

34. **As to claim 32** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **9** as set forth accordingly.

35. **As to claim 33** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **10** as set forth accordingly.

36. **As to claim 34** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **11** as set forth accordingly.

37. **As to claim 35** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **12** as set forth accordingly.

38. **As to claim 36** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **13** as set forth accordingly.

39. **As to claim 37** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 36), please refer to claim **14** as set forth accordingly.

40. **As to claim 38** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 36), please refer to claim **15** as set forth accordingly.

41. **As to claim 39** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 36), please refer to claim **16** as set forth accordingly.

42. **As to claim 40** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **17** as set forth accordingly.

43. **As to claim 41** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **18** as set forth accordingly.

44. **As to claim 42** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 41), please refer to claim **19** as set forth accordingly.

45. **As to claim 43** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 41), please refer to claim **20** as set forth accordingly.

46. **As to claim 44** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **21** as set forth accordingly.

47. **As to claim 45** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 44), please refer to claim **22** as set forth accordingly.

48. **As to claim 46** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 44), please refer to claim **23** as set forth accordingly.

49. Claims 8 and 31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blaser in view of Softricity and further in view of Osman et al., (*The Design and Implementation of Zap: A System for Migrating Computing Environments*, 2002, ACM, pp. 361-376) (hereinafter 'Osman') and Galen C. Hunt (Pub. No. US 2002/0072830 A1) (hereinafter 'Hunt')

50. **As to claim 8** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 1), although Blaser discloses hooking/redirected structures (e.g., Col. 15, Line 38 through Col.

20, Line 18) and its intercept/redirected mechanism for file system and registry accesses from applications (e.g., Col. 4, Lines 15-26), but Blaser and Softtricity do not explicitly disclose privatizing operating system shared component resource further comprising intercepting the RPC message call for replacing component information with privatized virtual component information; searching component redirecting information from the component redirection table; replacing RPC message with the privatized virtual component information retrieved from the component redirection table; returning the intercepted RPC message call to the requested call with the replaced message; continuing the RPC call to locate the privatized virtual component through SCM; redirecting the RPC message call as it is to the requested call for the component call originated from non secured run-time application and for the component call, which do not have redirecting information in the component redirection table.

However, in an analogous art of a system for migrating computing environments, Osman discloses intercepting the RPC message call for replacing component information with privatized virtual component information (e.g., Table 1 – Pod principles applied to resources – Network Resource; Sec. 4 – Zap Architecture, 2<sup>nd</sup> Para., Lines 1-12; Sec. 4.5 – Network Virtualization and Migration, 1<sup>st</sup> Para., Lines 4-11; 8<sup>th</sup> Para., Lines 1-8 – connection virtualization works by intercepting system calls for connection setup requests from the application to the transport protocol and replacing relevant physical addresses with virtual address); searching component redirecting information from the component redirection table; replacing RPC message with the privatized virtual

component information retrieved from the component redirection table returning the intercepted RPC message call to the requested call with the replaced message (e.g., Sec. 4.5 – Network Virtualization and Migration, 9<sup>th</sup> Para., Lines 1-9 – Connection translation works by intercepting packets below the transport protocol layer and translating the virtual address in the packet headers to physical address).

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made to combine the teachings of Osman into the Blaser-Softricity's system to further provide intercepting the RPC message call for replacing component information with privatized virtual component information; searching component redirecting information from the component redirection table; replacing RPC message with the privatized virtual component information retrieved from the component redirection table; returning the intercepted RPC message call to the requested call with the replaced message in Blaser-Softricity's system.

The motivation is that it would enhance the Blaser-Softricity's system by taking, advancing and/or incorporating Osman's system which provides a framework for network virtualization as once suggested by Osman (e.g., Sec. 4.5 – Network Virtualization and Migration, 1<sup>st</sup> Para.).

Although Osman discloses network virtualization (e.g., Sec. 4.5) but Blaser, Softricity and Osman do not explicitly disclose continuing the RPC call to locate the privatized virtual component through SCM; redirecting the RPC message call as it is to the requested call for the component call originated from

non secured run-time application and for the component call, which do not have redirecting information in the component redirection table.

However, in an art of dynamic classification of sections of software, Hunt discloses the protocol stack, protocol information for remote communication, the DCOM network protocol which is a superset of Open Group's Distributed Computing Environment Remote Procedure Call (DCE RPC) protocol, and Service Control Manager; All of them are the essential building blocks for distributed Windows applications (e.g., [0076], Lines 21-33; Fig. 4, elements 108/144 – Service Control Manager, 120 – DCOM Network Protocol).

Further, Hunt discloses continuing the RPC call (e.g., [0077], Lines 1-6, 21-33 – the proxy and stub typically include a protocol stack and protocol information for remote communication, for example, the DCOM network protocol, which is a superset of the Open Group's Distributed Computing Environment Remote Procedure Call (DCE RPC) protocol) to locate the privatized virtual component through SCM; redirecting the RPC message call as it is to the requested call for the component call originated from non secured run-time application and for the component call, which do not have redirecting information in the component redirection table (e.g., Fig. 4, elements 108, 144 – Service Control Manager; [0073] – after instantiation, DCOM supports cross-process or cross-machine communication; [0074] – a local service control manager connects to a remote service control manager, which requests creation of the component through the "CoCreateInstance" API).

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made to combine the teachings of Hunt into the Blaser-Softricity-Osman system to further provide continuing the RPC call to locate the privatized virtual component through SCM; redirecting the RPC message call as it is to the requested call for the component call originated from non secured run-time application and for the component call, which do not have redirecting information in the component redirection table in Blaser- Softricity-Osman's system.

The motivation is that it would enhance the Blaser-Softricity-Osman's system by taking, advancing and/or incorporating Hunt's system which is coupled with a distributed object system such as Microsoft™ Corporation's Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM™) to further provide system services that support execution of distributed application once suggested by Hunt (e.g., [0005]).

51. **As to claim 31** (Original) (incorporating the rejection in claim 24), please refer to claim **8** as set forth accordingly.



**Conclusion**


52. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Ben C. Wang whose telephone number is 571-270-1240. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday - Friday, 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., EST.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Tuan Q. Dam can be reached on 571-272-3695. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.

BCW *BW*

December 5, 2007

  
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SUPERVISOR/PATENT EXAMINER